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rulings in both cases and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.
JustineShepherd
V Bar Ranch LLC v. Cotten, 233 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2010) (holding
that the State Engineer has the power to change and revoke well
permits, and that the beneficial use of water on the date of
appropriation controls the scope of water rights).
V Bar Ranch LLC ("V Bar") drilled a well in 1946 ("Well No. 1")
that predated state law requiring wells be registered or permitted.
For two decades, V Bar used WelliNo. 1 to irrigate only the Southwest
Quarter of Section 3. In 1966, V Bar obtained the Northwest Quarter
of Section 3 and subsequently used Well No. 1 to irrigate both
quarters. In 1972, V Bar applied to the District Court for Water
Division 3 ("water court") for adjudication of Well No. 1. The water
court gave the well an appropriation date of. 1946 without assigning
an acreage or volumetric limitation. V Bar irrigated the Southwest
and Northwest Quarters of Section 3 until 1978. In 2005, the State
Engineer issued a replacement well permit that allowed V Bar to
irrigate both quarters. George Gallegos, a neighboring landowner
then petitioned the State to revoke V Bar's replacement well permit
on the grounds that the State Engineer erroneously allowed V Bar to
expand its water rights beyond the confines of the Southwest Quarter
in violation of C.R.S § 37-90-137(1).
A hearing officer found that the date of Well No. 1's
appropriation, 1946, was the operative date in determining the scope
of V Bar's water rights. The officer also found that the State Engineer
issued the replacement well permit erroneously by allowing V Bar to
expand its water use without a proper decree from a water court.
The State Engineer affirmed the decision. On V Bar's appeal, the
water court likewise affirmed, upholding application of the 1946
appropriation date and rejecting V Bar's contention that the State
Engineer lacked jurisdiction to hear and act upon Gallegos's petition
for revocation of the replacement well permit. V Bar appealed to the
Colorado Supreme Court ("court") to contest the State Engineer's
jurisdiction and object to the operative date for determination of
scope. V Bar also argued for application of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to prevent the State Engineer from modifying the
replacement well permit.
The court first addressed the question of jurisdiction. The court
found two legislative acts useful in assessing the extent of the State
Engineer's authority: the Colorado Administrative Procedures Act
("APA"), and the Water Rights Determination and Adjudication Act
of 1969 ("1969 Act"). The APA authorizes state agencies to revoke
licenses; the court noted that a well permit is a "license" under the
APA criteria. The 1969 Act establishes the framework for the existing
water courts and extends exclusive jurisdiction to these courts in
"water matters." Though the 1969 Act does not define "water
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matters," the court pointed to past decrees from the Generally
Assembly and language in several Colorado statutes delegating power
to the State Engineer in some of these matters. Specifically, these
authorities charge the State Engineer with the duty to investigate
improper issuance of wells and to decide whether the permit ought to
be modified or revoked.
Next, the court considered V Bar's objection to the operative date
for determination of the scope of the water rights. V Bar argued that
the adjudication date should be applied, thus permitting V Bar to
irrigate both quarters. The court disagreed, noting Colorado law
indicating that appropriation and subsequent confirmation through
judicial decree form water rights. Common law further indicates that
water appropriated for use on a given parcel of land cannot expand
to other lands unless the water court issues a decree allowing such a
change. The court noted that V Bar never attempted to obtain a
decree from the water court, nor did V Bar seek appropriation for the
Northwest Quarter upon its request for adjudication in 1972. The
1969 Act also calls for the evaluation of the beneficial use of the
water, whereby only an amount of water that is "reasonable and
appropriate" may be appropriated to "accomplish without waste" the
purpose of the appropriation. In the case of Well No. 1, the court
ruled that the water court appropriated the beneficial use exclusively
for the Southwest Quarter in 1946. As a result, the court concluded
that V Bar had no grounds to expand its appropriation to the
Northwest Quarter.
The court also found -the Groundwater Management Act of 1965
("1965 Act") valuable in dismissing V Bar's argument procedurally.
The 1965 Act requires parties seeking to drill new wells or expand
existing wells to obtain a permit from the State Engineer. V Bar
neglected to petition the State Engineer for this permit upon
irrigation of the Northwest Quarter in 1966, thereby failing to satisfy
the terms of the 1965 Act. The court concluded that the adjudication
of Well No. 1 confined use to the Southwest Quarter and that the
State Engineer did not have the power to expand irrigation to the
Northwest quarter.
Lastly, the court examined grounds for invoking equitable
estoppel against the State Engineer. V Bar asserted that it attempted
to register Well No. 1 and list both quarters but claimed that the State
Engineer told V Bar this was not necessary. Additionally, V Bar
claimed detrimental reliance upon the replacement well permit due
to the purchase and installation of a sprinkler system. The court
rejected V Bar's claims, citing common law indicating that the State
Engineer only administers rights upon the decrees of the water court.
Thus, the State Engineer had no authority to create or expand V Bar's
rights beyond the scope of the 1946 appropriation.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court's decision that the
State Engineer acted properly in modifying the replacement well
permit. Moreover, the court agreed that the beneficial use on the
appropriation date controlled the scope of water rights. Finally, the
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court found no grounds to invoke equitable estoppel.
John Bartholomew

IDAHO
Lake CDA Inv., LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Lands, 233 P.3d 721
(Idaho 2010) (holding that the state's highway easements extended to
a lake's ordinary high water mark and, subsequently, did not
terminate the landowner's littoral rights; the fill the state added to the
lake was part of the public land trust but also did not eliminate littoral
rights; and the landowner's did not need to apply for highway
encroachment permits for proposed docks that would rest on the
public land trust fill).
In 2006, Lake CDA Investments . and Chris Keenan
("Landowners") applied for dock permits for separate properties
located on Lake Coeur d'Alene with the Idaho Department of Lands
("Land Board") and the Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD").
On March 30, 2007, the Land Board held an administrative hearing,
combining the Landowners' applications.
At the hearing, an ITD surveyor testified that the Landowners'
predecessor in interest deeded a 1940 highway easement ("1940
easement") to the State of Idaho. The surveyor further testified that
this easement extended out into the lake and, therefore, made the
The
Landowners' riparian rights subordinate to the easement.
hearing officer recommended the Land Board reject the applications,
finding that the Landowners' littoral rights were subordinate to the
1940 easement. The hearing officer reasoned that without littoral
rights the Landowners were not qualified to apply for the dock
permits. The Land Board subsequently rejected the Landowners'
applications based on the hearing officer's recommendations.
The Landowners then appealed to the Idaho District Court. The
district court vacated the Land Board's decision, ruling that the 1940
easement did not affect the Landowners' littoral rights because the
easement only extended down to the ordinary high water mark. In
addition, the district court awarded the Landowners attorneys' fees
and costs of $23,128.51.
The Land Board and ITD then appealed to the Supreme Court of
Idaho ("court"). The Land Board and ITD argued that the first issue,
whether the 1940 easement extinguished the Landowners' littoral
rights, was analogous to the court's rulings on railroad easements,
However, the court
which required exclusive easements.
distinguished railroad easements from highway easements, reasoning
that the state holds highways in trust for public use, and thus,
highways do not require exclusive easements. Furthermore, the court
ruled that the 1940 easement did not grant an easement over the
disputed area because the Landowners, as littoral owners,. only took

